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STATUS OF THIS MEMO 
 
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 
all the provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1]. 
 
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other 
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. 
 
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 
 
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 
 
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 
 
Comments and suggestions on this document are encouraged. Comments on  
this document should be sent to the PKIX working group discussion list 
<ietf-pkix@imc.org> or directly to the authors. 
 





This document describes LDAP schema features that are needed to support  
X.509 Public Key Infrastructures. Specifically, X.509 attribute types,  
object classes, matching rules, attribute value syntaxes and attribute  
value assertion syntaxes needed for PKIs are defined. 
 
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and  "OPTIONAL" in this 





RFC2587 [8] describes some of the PKI subschema applicable to LDAPv2 [2]  
servers, specifically the public key certificate related attribute types  
and object classes that MUST or MAY be supported. RFC 2256 [17]  
describes some of the PKI related subschema elements for LDAPv3 [4]  
servers. This [document/ID/standard] supercedes both RFC2587 and RFC  
2256 and provides the complete PKI subschema for LDAP v3 [4] servers. 
  
2. Subschema Publishing 
 
LDAPv3 allows the subschema supported by a server to be published in a  
subschema subentry. Clients following this profile which support the  
Search operation containing an extensible matching rule SHOULD use the  
subschemaSubentry attribute in the root DSE to find the  
subschemaSubentry, and SHOULD use the matchingRule and matchingRuleUse  
operational attributes in the subschema subentry in order to determine  
whether the server supports the various matching rules described below.  
Servers that support extensible matching SHOULD publish the matching  




3. PKI Attributes and Syntaxes 
 
3.1  userCertificate Attribute 
 
The userCertificate attribute type contains the public-key certificates  
a user has obtained from one or more CAs. The LDAPspecific encoding for  
values of this attribute is described in section 3.3.  
 
    ( 2.5.4.36 NAME 'userCertificate' 
      EQUALITY certificateExactMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8 ) 
 
3.2  cACertificate Attribute 
 
The cACertificate attribute of a CA's directory entry shall be used to  
store self-issued certificates (if any) and certificates issued to this  
CA by CAs in the same realm as this CA. The LDAP-specific encoding for  
values of this attribute is described in section 3.3.  
 
    ( 2.5.4.37 NAME 'cACertificate' 
EQUALITY certificateExactMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8 ) 
 
3.3  Certificate Syntax 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for a certificate value is the octet string  
that results from the BER and/or DER-encoding of an X.509 public key  
certificate.  The following string states the OID assigned to this  
syntax: 
 
      ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8 DESC 'A BER and/or DER encoded  
public key certificate' ) 
 
Servers MUST preserve values in this syntax exactly as given to them by  
the client, when storing and retrieving certificates. Transformation of  
these values between storage and retrieval MUST NOT take place. 
 
Note. The BNF notation in RFC 1778 [12] for "User Certificate" MUST NOT  
be used. Values in this syntax MUST be transferred as BER and/or DER  
encoded octets. 
 
3.4 authorityRevocationList Attribute 
 
A value of this attribute is a list of CA certificates that are no  
longer valid.  The LDAP-specific encoding for values of this attribute  
is described in section 3.7.  
 
    ( 2.5.4.38 NAME 'authorityRevocationList' 
EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9 ) 
 
3.5 certificateRevocationList Attribute 
 
A value of this attribute is a list of user certificates that are no  
longer valid.  The LDAP-specific encoding for values of this attribute  
is described in section 3.7. 
 
    ( 2.5.4.39 NAME 'certificateRevocationList' 
EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9 ) 
 
3.6 deltaRevocationList Attribute 
 
This attribute contains a list of revoked certificates (user or CA) that  
is an addition to a previous certificate revocation list.  The LDAP- 
specific encoding for values of this attribute is described in section  
3.7.   
 
    ( 2.5.4.53 NAME 'deltaRevocationList' 
EQUALITY certificateListExactMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9 ) 
 
3.7 Certificate List Syntax 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for a certificate list value is the octet  
string that results from BER/DER-encoding an X.509 certificate  
revocation list.  The following string states the OID assigned to this  
syntax: 
 
      ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.9 DESC 'Certificate List' ) 
 
Servers MUST preserve values in this syntax exactly as given when  
storing and retrieving them. The BNF notation in RFC 1778 [12] for  
"Authority Revocation List" MUST NOT be used. 
 
3.8 crossCertificatePair Attribute 
 
The following definition is taken from X.509(2000) [9]. The term forward  
was used in earlier editions of X.509 for issuedToThisCA and the term  
reverse was used in earlier editions for issuedByThisCA. 
 
The issuedToThisCA elements of the crossCertificatePair attribute of a CA's  
directory entry shall be used to store all, except self-issued  
certificates, issued to this CA.  Optionally, the issuedByThisCA elements  
of the crossCertificatePair attribute, of a CA's directory entry may 
contain  
a subset of certificates issued by this CA to other CAs. If a CA issues  
a certificate to another CA, and the subject CA is not a subordinate to  
the issuer CA in a hierarchy, then the issuer CA shall place that  
certificate in the issuedByThisCA element of the crossCertificatePair 
attribute  
of its own directory entry.  When both the issuedToThisCA and the  
issuedByThisCA elements are present in a single attribute value, issuer  
name in one certificate shall match the subject name in the other and  
vice versa, and the subject public key in one certificate shall be  
capable of verifying the digital signature on the other certificate and  
vice versa.  
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for values of this attribute is described in  
section 3.9.  
 
    ( 2.5.4.40 NAME 'crossCertificatePair' 
EQUALITY certificatePairExactMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.10 ) 
 
3.9  Certificate Pair Syntax 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for a certificate pair value is the octet  
string that results from the BER/DER-encoding an X.509 public key  
certificate pair.  The following string states the OID assigned to this  
syntax: 
 
      ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.10 DESC 'Certificate Pair' ) 
 
Servers MUST preserve values in this syntax exactly as given when  
storing and retrieving them. The BNF notation in RFC 1778 [12] for  
"Certificate Pair" MUST NOT be used. Servers must preserve values in  
this syntax exactly as given when storing and retrieving them. 
 
3.10 PKI Path Attribute 
 
The PKI path attribute is used to store certification paths, each  
consisting of a sequence of cross-certificates. The LDAP-specific  
encoding for values of this attribute is described in section 3.11.   
 
 
( 2.5.4.70 NAME 'pkiPath' 
      SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.19) 
 
The following description is copied from X.509 (2000) [9].  
 
"This attribute can be stored in the CA directory entry and would  
contain some certification paths from that CA to other CAs. This  
attribute, if used, enables more efficient retrieval of cross- 
certificates that form frequently used certification paths. As  
such there are no specific requirements for this attribute to be  
used and the set of values that are stored in the attribute will  
likely not represent the complete set of forward certification  
paths for any given CA."  
 
 
3.11  PKI Path Syntax 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for a PKI path value is the octet string that  
results from the BER/DER-encoding of a sequence of cross certificates.   
The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax: 
 
      ( 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.19 DESC 'PKI Path' ) 
 
Servers MUST preserve values in this syntax exactly as given when  
storing and retrieving them. 
 
3.12  CPS Attribute  
 
The CPS attribute is used to store a certification authority's  
certification practice statement.  
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.31 NAME 'cps' 
SUBSTR caseIgnoreSubstringsMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15) 
 
3.13  CPS Pointer Attribute 
 
The CPS pointer attribute is used to store a pointer to a certification  
authority's certification practice statement in the form of a URI.  
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.32 NAME 'cpsPointer' 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.26) 
 
3.14 Certificate Policy Attribute  
 
The certificatePolicy attribute is used to store information about a  
certification authority's certificate policy (either directly or  
indirectly). The LDAP-specific encoding for values of this attribute is  
described in section 3.15. 
 
( 2.5.4.69 NAME 'certificatePolicy' 
EQUALITY objectIdentifierFirstComponentMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.20) 
 
3.15 Certificate Policy Syntax 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for a certificate policy value is the octet  
string that results from the BERencoding of a sequence of the policy  
object identifier and policy information.  The following string states  
the OID assigned to this syntax: 
 
      ( 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.20 DESC 'CA certificate policy' ) 
 
3.16  Certificate Policy Pointer Attribute 
 
The CP pointer attribute is used to store a pointer to a certification  
authority's certificate policy in the form of a URI.  
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.1.1.33 NAME 'cpPointer' 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.26) 
 
3.17  Supported Algorithms Attribute 
 
This attribute is used to support the selection of an algorithm for use  
when communicating with a remote end entity using certificates. The  
LDAP-specific encoding for values of this attribute is described in  
section 3.17. 
 
    ( 2.5.4.52 NAME 'supportedAlgorithms' 
EQUALITY objectIdentifierFirstComponentMatch 
      SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.49 ) 
 
3.18 Supported Algorithm Syntax 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding for a supported algorithm value is the octet  
string that results from the BER encoding of a SupportedAlgorithm ASN.1  
value.  The following string states the OID assigned to this syntax: 
 
      ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.49 DESC 'Supported Algorithm' ) 
 
 
4. Public Key Certificate Matching Rules and Assertion Syntaxes 
 X.509 [9] supports both equality and flexible certificate matching rules  
by the server, via the certificateExactMatch and certificateMatch  
MATCHING-RULEs respectively. (For example, a client may flexibly search  
for certificates with a particular validity time, key usage, policy or  
other field.) LDAP servers MUST support the certificateExactMatch  
matching rule. Clients MAY support certificateExactMatch values for  
equalityMatch filters. LDAPv3 servers SHOULD support the  
certificateMatch matching rule. If the server does support flexible  
matching (either via certificateMatch or some other matching rule), then  
the extensibleMatch filter of the Search request MUST be supported.  
Clients MAY support the extensibleMatch filter and one or more of the  
optional elements of certificateMatch. 
 
The LDAP-specific (i.e. string) encodings for the assertion syntaxes  
defined in this document are specified by the Generic String Encoding  
Rules (GSER) [13]. The ABNF in this document for these assertion  
syntaxes is provided only as a convenience and is equivalent to the  
encoding specified by the application of [13]. (The only exception to  
this is the alternative simple endoding for certificatExactMatch.) Since  
the associated ASN.1 types for the assertion syntaxes described here may  
be extended in future editions of X.509 [9], the provided ABNF should be  
regarded as a snapshot in time. The LDAP-specific encoding for any  
extension to a syntax's underlying ASN.1 type can be determined from  
[13]. In the event that there is a discrepancy between the ABNF in this  
document and the encoding determined by [13], [13] is to be taken as  
definitive.  
 
4.1  Certificate Exact Match 
 
Certificate exact match is defined in 11.3.1 of [9].  The string  
description of the certificateExactMatch matching rule is: 
 
    ( 2.5.13.34 NAME 'certificateExactMatch' 
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.1 ) 
 
The LDAP syntax definition of the above is: 
 
      (1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.1  
DESC 'Certificate Serial Number and Issuer Name' ) 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is a  
choice between  
 
- the GSER encoding defined by [13]<GSERCertificateExactAssertion> and  
- the simple encoding defined by <SimpleCertificateExactAssertion>.  
 
The full syntax is described by the following Augmented BNF [10]: 
 
CertificateExactAssertion = GSERCertificateExactAssertion / 
                            SimpleCertificateExactAssertion 
 
SimpleCertificateExactAssertion = CertificateSerialNumber "$" LDAPDN 
 
<LDAPDN> is a string encoding of a distinguished name as defined in [6]. 
 
GSERCertificateExactAssertion = "{" sp cea-serialNumber "," 
                                sp cea-issuer 
                                sp "}" 
 
cea-serialNumber = id-serialNumber msp CertificateSerialNumber 
cea-issuer       = id-issuer       msp Name 
 
id-serialNumber = %x73.65.72.69.61.6C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72 
                     ; "serialNumber" 
id-issuer       = %x69.73.73.75.65.72 ; "issuer" 
 
Name           = id-rdnSequence ":" RDNSequence 
id-rdnSequence = %x72.64.6E.53.65.71.75.65.6E.63.65 ; "rdnSequence" 
 
CertificateSerialNumber = INTEGER 
 
Note. [14] states that CAs MUST force the serialNumber to be a non- 
negative integer. Non-conforming CAs MAY issue certificates with serial  
numbers that are negative, or zero.  Certificate users SHOULD be  
prepared to handle such certificates. 
 
The <sp>, <msp>, <RDNSequence> and <INTEGER> rules are given in [16].  
 
4.2 Certificate Match 
 
Certificate match is defined in 11.3.2 of [9]. The string description 
of the certificateMatch matching rule is: 
 
( 2.5.13.35 NAME 'certificateMatch' 
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.2) 
 
The syntax definition is: 
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.2 DESC 'Certificate Assertion' ) 
 
The ASN.1 for CertificateAssertion is defined in 11.3.2 of [9], as 
are the semantics of each of its component types. 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is  
defined by [13] and described by the following ABNF: 
 
CertificateAssertion = "{"    [ sp ca-serialNumber ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-issuer ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-subjectKeyIdentifier ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-authorityKeyIdentifier ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-certificateValid ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-privateKeyValid ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-subjectPublicKeyAlgID ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-keyUsage ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-subjectAltName ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-policy ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-pathToName ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-subject ] 
                          [ sep sp ca-nameConstraints ] 
                                sp "}" 
 
The <sep> rule is given in [16]. 
 
 
ca-serialNumber           = id-serialNumber msp 
                               CertificateSerialNumber 
ca-issuer                 = id-issuer msp Name 
ca-subjectKeyIdentifier   = id-subjectKeyIdentifier msp 
                               SubjectKeyIdentifier 
ca-authorityKeyIdentifier = id-authorityKeyIdentifier msp 
                               AuthorityKeyIdentifier 
ca-certificateValid       = certificateValid msp Time 
ca-privateKeyValid        = id-privateKeyValid msp GeneralizedTime 
ca-subjectPublicKeyAlgID  = id-subjectPublicKeyAlgID msp 
                               OBJECT-IDENTIFIER 
ca-keyUsage               = id-keyUsage msp KeyUsage 
ca-subjectAltName         = id-subjectAltName msp AltNameType 
ca-policy                 = id-policy msp CertPolicySet 
ca-pathToName             = id-pathToName msp Name 
ca-subject                = id-subject msp Name 
ca-nameConstraints        = id-nameConstraints msp 
                               NameConstraintsSyntax 
 
id-subjectKeyIdentifier   = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74.4B.65.79.49.64.65 
                               %x6E.74.69.66.69.65.72 
                               ; "subjectKeyIdentifier" 
id-authorityKeyIdentifier = %x61.75.74.68.6F.72.69.74.79.4B.65.79.49 
                               %x64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65.72 
                               ; "authorityKeyIdentifier" 
id-certificateValid       = %x63.65.72.74.69.66.69.63.61.74.65.56.61 
                               %x6C.69.64 ; "certificateValid" 
id-privateKeyValid        = %x70.72.69.76.61.74.65.4B.65.79.56.61.6C 
                               %x69.64 ; "privateKeyValid" 
id-subjectPublicKeyAlgID  = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74.50.75.62.6C.69.63 
                               %x4B.65.79.41.6C.67.49.44 
                               ; "subjectPublicKeyAlgID" 
id-keyUsage               = %x6B.65.79.55.73.61.67.65 ; "keyUsage" 
id-subjectAltName         = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74.41.6C.74.4E.61.6D 
                               %x65 ; "subjectAltName" 
id-policy                 = %x70.6F.6C.69.63.79 ; "policy" 
id-pathToName             = %x70.61.74.68.54.6F.4E.61.6D.65 
                               ; "pathToName" 
id-subject                = %x73.75.62.6A.65.63.74 ; "subject" 
id-nameConstraints        = %x6E.61.6D.65.43.6F.6E.73.74.72.61.69.6E 
                               %x74.73 ; "nameConstraints" 
 
SubjectKeyIdentifier = KeyIdentifier 
 
KeyIdentifier = OCTET-STRING 
 
AuthorityKeyIdentifier = "{"    [ sp aki-keyIdentifier ] 
                            [ sep sp aki-authorityCertIssuer ] 
                            [ sep sp aki-authorityCertSerialNumber ] 
                                  sp "}" 
 
aki-keyIdentifier       = id-keyIdentifier msp KeyIdentifier 
aki-authorityCertIssuer = id-authorityCertIssuer msp GeneralNames 
 
GeneralNames = "{" sp GeneralName *( "," sp GeneralName ) sp "}" 
GeneralName  = gn-otherName 
               / gn-rfc822Name 
               / gn-dNSName 
               / gn-x400Address 
               / gn-directoryName 
               / gn-ediPartyName 
               / gn-uniformResourceIdentifier 
               / gn-iPAddress 
               / gn-registeredID 
 
gn-otherName     = id-otherName       ":" OtherName 
gn-rfc822Name    = id-rfc822Name      ":" IA5String 
gn-dNSName       = id-dNSName         ":" IA5String 
gn-x400Address   = id-x400Address     ":" ORAddress 
gn-directoryName = id-directoryName   ":" Name 
gn-ediPartyName  = id-ediPartyName    ":" EDIPartyName 
gn-iPAddress     = id-iPAddress       ":" OCTET-STRING 
gn-registeredID  = gn-id-registeredID ":" OBJECT-IDENTIFIER 
 
gn-uniformResourceIdentifier = id-uniformResourceIdentifier 
                                  ":" IA5String 
 
id-otherName       = %x6F.74.68.65.72.4E.61.6D.65 ; "otherName" 
gn-id-registeredID = %x72.65.67.69.73.74.65.72.65.64.49.44 
                        ; "registeredID" 
 
OtherName  = "{" sp on-type-id "," sp on-value sp "}" 
on-type-id = id-type-id msp OBJECT-IDENTIFIER 
on-value   = id-value msp Value 
id-type-id = %x74.79.70.65.2D.69.64 ; "type-id" 
id-value   = %x76.61.6C.75.65       ; "value" 
 
The <Value> rule is defined in [13]. 
 
EDIPartyName    = "{" [ sp nameAssigner "," ] sp partyName sp "}" 
nameAssigner    = id-nameAssigner msp DirectoryString 
partyName       = id-partyName msp DirectoryString 
id-nameAssigner = %x6E.61.6D.65.41.73.73.69.67.6E.65.72 
                     ; "nameAssigner" 
id-partyName    = %x70.61.72.74.79.4E.61.6D.65 ; "partyName" 
 
aki-authorityCertSerialNumber = id-authorityCertSerialNumber msp 
                                   CertificateSerialNumber 
 
id-keyIdentifier       = %x6B.65.79.49.64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65.72 
                            ; "keyIdentifier" 
id-authorityCertIssuer = %x61.75.74.68.6F.72.69.74.79.43.65.72.74.49 
                            %x73.73.75.65.72 ; "authorityCertIssuer" 
 
id-authorityCertSerialNumber = %x61.75.74.68.6F.72.69.74.79.43.65.72 
                                  %x74.53.65.72.69.61.6C.4E.75.6D.62 
                                  %x65.72 
                                  ; "authorityCertSerialNumber" 
 
Time                 = time-utcTime / time-generalizedTime 
time-utcTime         = id-utcTime         ":" UTCTime 
time-generalizedTime = id-generalizedTime ":" GeneralizedTime 
id-utcTime           = %x75.74.63.54.69.6D.65 ; "utcTime" 
id-generalizedTime   = %x67.65.6E.65.72.61.6C.69.7A.65.64.54.69.6D.65 
                          ; "generalizedTime" 
 
KeyUsage           = BIT-STRING / key-usage-bit-list 
key-usage-bit-list = "{" [ sp key-usage *( "," sp key-usage ) ] sp "}" 
 
The <key-usage-bit-list> rule encodes the one bits in a KeyUsage value  
as a comma separated list of identifiers. The <BIT-STRING> rule is given  
in [16]. 
 
key-usage = id-digitalSignature 
            / id-nonRepudiation 
            / id-keyEncipherment 
            / id-dataEncipherment 
            / id-keyAgreement 
            / id-keyCertSign 
            / id-cRLSign 
            / id-encipherOnly 
            / id-decipherOnly 
 
id-digitalSignature = %x64.69.67.69.74.61.6C.53.69.67.6E.61.74.75.72 
                         %x65 ; "digitalSignature" 
id-nonRepudiation   = %x6E.6F.6E.52.65.70.75.64.69.61.74.69.6F.6E 
                         ; "nonRepudiation" 
id-keyEncipherment  = %x6B.65.79.45.6E.63.69.70.68.65.72.6D.65.6E.74 
                         ; "keyEncipherment" 
id-dataEncipherment = %x64.61.74.61.45.6E.63.69.70.68.65.72.6D.65.6E 
                         %x74 ; "dataEncipherment" 
id-keyAgreement     = %x6B.65.79.41.67.72.65.65.6D.65.6E.74 
                         ; "keyAgreement" 
id-keyCertSign      = %x6B.65.79.43.65.72.74.53.69.67.6E 
                         ; "keyCertSign" 
id-cRLSign          = %x63.52.4C.53.69.67.6E ; "cRLSign" 
id-encipherOnly     = %x65.6E.63.69.70.68.65.72.4F.6E.6C.79 
                         ; "encipherOnly" 
id-decipherOnly     = %x64.65.63.69.70.68.65.72.4F.6E.6C.79 
                         ; "decipherOnly" 
 
AltNameType = ant-builtinNameForm / ant-otherNameForm 
 
ant-builtinNameForm = id-builtinNameForm ":" BuiltinNameForm 
ant-otherNameForm   = id-otherNameForm   ":" OBJECT-IDENTIFIER 
 
id-builtinNameForm = %x62.75.69.6C.74.69.6E.4E.61.6D.65.46.6F.72.6D 
                           ; "builtinNameForm" 
id-otherNameForm   = %x6F.74.68.65.72.4E.61.6D.65.46.6F.72.6D 
                           ; "otherNameForm" 
 
BuiltinNameForm  = id-rfc822Name 
                   / id-dNSName 
                   / id-x400Address 
                   / id-directoryName 
                   / id-ediPartyName 
                   / id-uniformResourceIdentifier 
                   / id-iPAddress 
                   / id-registeredId 
id-rfc822Name    = %x72.66.63.38.32.32.4E.61.6D.65 ; "rfc822Name" 
id-dNSName       = %x64.4E.53.4E.61.6D.65 ; "dNSName" 
id-x400Address   = %x78.34.30.30.41.64.64.72.65.73.73 
                      ; "x400Address" 
id-directoryName = %x64.69.72.65.63.74.6F.72.79.4E.61.6D.65 
                      ; "directoryName" 
id-ediPartyName  = %x65.64.69.50.61.72.74.79.4E.61.6D.65 
                      ; "ediPartyName" 
id-iPAddress     = %x69.50.41.64.64.72.65.73.73 ; "iPAddress" 
id-registeredId  = %x72.65.67.69.73.74.65.72.65.64.49.64 
                      ; "registeredId" 
 
id-uniformResourceIdentifier = %x75.6E.69.66.6F.72.6D.52.65.73.6F.75 
                               %x72.63.65.49.64.65.6E.74.69.66.69.65 
                               %x72 ; "uniformResourceIdentifier" 
 
CertPolicySet = "{" sp CertPolicyId *( "," sp CertPolicyId ) sp "}" 
CertPolicyId  = OBJECT-IDENTIFIER 
 
NameConstraintsSyntax = "{"    [ sp ncs-permittedSubtrees ] 
                           [ sep sp ncs-excludedSubtrees ] 
                                 sp "}" 
 
ncs-permittedSubtrees = id-permittedSubtrees msp GeneralSubtrees 
ncs-excludedSubtrees  = id-excludedSubtrees  msp GeneralSubtrees 
id-permittedSubtrees  = %x70.65.72.6D.69.74.74.65.64.53.75.62.74.72 
                           %x65.65.73 ; "permittedSubtrees" 
id-excludedSubtrees   = %x65.78.63.6C.75.64.65.64.53.75.62.74.72.65 
                           %x65.73 ; "excludedSubtrees" 
 
GeneralSubtrees = "{" sp GeneralSubtree 
                     *( "," sp GeneralSubtree ) sp "}" 
GeneralSubtree  = "{"      sp gs-base 
                     [ "," sp gs-minimum ] 
                     [ "," sp gs-maximum ] 
                           sp "}" 
 
gs-base      = id-base    msp GeneralName 
gs-minimum   = id-minimum msp BaseDistance 
gs-maximum   = id-maximum msp BaseDistance 
id-base      = %x62.61.73.65          ; "base" 
id-minimum   = %x6D.69.6E.69.6D.75.6D ; "minimum" 
id-maximum   = %x6D.61.78.69.6D.75.6D ; "maximum" 
BaseDistance = INTEGER-0-MAX 
 
The <OBJECT-IDENTIFIER>, <OCTET-STRING>, <IA5String>, <DirectoryString>,  
<RelativeDistinguishedName>, <UTCTime>, <GeneralizedTime>, <INTEGER-0- 
MAX> and <ORAddress> rules are given in [16]. 
 
4.3 Certificate Pair Exact Match 
 
Certificate pair exact match is defined in 11.3.3 of [9]. The string  
description of the certificatePairExactMatch matching rule is: 
 
( 2.5.13.36 NAME 'certificatePairExactMatch' 
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.8) 
 
 
The LDAP syntax definition is: 
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.8 
    DESC 'Certificate Pair Exact Assertion' ) 
 
The ASN.1 for CertificatePairExactAssertion is defined in 11.3.3 of [9],  
as are the semantics of each of its component types. 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is  
defined by [13] and described by the following Augmented BNF [10]: 
 
CertificatePairExactAssertion = "{"   [ sp cpea-issuedTo ] 
                                   [sep sp cpea-issuedBy ] 
                                        sp "}" 
 
At least one of <cpea-issuedTo> or <cpea-issuedBy> MUST be present. 
 
cpea-issuedTo = id-issuedToThisCAAssertion msp 
                   CertificateExactAssertion 
cpea-issuedBy = id-issuedByThisCAAssertion msp 
                   CertificateExactAssertion 
 
id-issuedToThisCAAssertion = %x69.73.73.75.65.64.54.6F.54.68.69.73.43 
                                %x41.41.73.73.65.72.74.69.6F.6E 
                                ; "issuedToThisCAAssertion" 
id-issuedByThisCAAssertion = %x69.73.73.75.65.64.42.79.54.68.69.73.43 
                                %x41.41.73.73.65.72.74.69.6F.6E 
                                ; "issuedByThisCAAssertion" 
 
 
4.4 Certificate Pair Match 
 
Certificate pair match is defined in 11.3.4 of [9]. The string  
description of the certificatePairMatch matching rule is: 
 
 
( 2.5.13.37 NAME 'certificatePairExactMatch' 
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.9) 
 
 
The LDAP syntax definition is: 
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.9 
    DESC 'Certificate Pair Assertion' ) 
 
The ASN.1 for CertificatePairAssertion is defined in 11.3.4 of [9], as  
are the semantics of each of its component types. 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is  
defined by [13] and described by the following Augmented BNF [10]: 
 
 
CertificatePairAssertion = "{"   [ sp cpa-issuedTo ] 
                              [sep sp cpa-issuedBy ] 
                                   sp "}" 
 
At least one of <cpa-issuedTo> and <cpa-issuedBy> MUST be present. 
 
cpa-issuedTo = id-issuedToThisCAAssertion msp CertificateAssertion 
cpa-issuedBy = id-issuedByThisCAAssertion msp CertificateAssertion 
 
5 Certificate Revocation List Matching Rules 
 
X.509[9] defines both equality and flexible matching rules for CRLs, via  
the certificateListExactMatch and certificateListMatch MATCHING-RULEs  
respectively. LDAP servers MUST support the certificateListExactMatch  
matching rule. Clients MAY support certificateListExactMatch values for  
equalityMatch filters. LDAPv3 servers MAY support the  
certificateListMatch matching rule. If the server does support flexible  
matching (either via certificateListMatch or some other matching rule),  
then the extensibleMatch filter of the Search request MUST be supported.  
Clients MAY support the extensibleMatch filter and one or more of the  
optional elements of certificateListMatch.  
 
5.1  Certificate List Exact Match 
 
Certificate List exact match is defined in 11.3.5 of [9]. The string 
description of the certificateListExactMatch matching rule is: 
 
( 2.5.13.38 NAME 'certificateListExactMatch' 
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.3) 
 
The syntax definition is: 
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.3 DESC 'Certificate List Exact Assertion (Issuer  
name, time and distribution point name)' ) 
 
The ASN.1 for CertificateListExactAssertion is defined in 11.3.5 of [9],  
as are the semantics of each of its component types. 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is  
defined by [13] and described  
by the following ABNF: 
 
CertificateListExactAssertion = "{"      sp clea-issuer 
                                     "," sp clea-thisUpdate 
                                   [ "," sp clea-distributionPoint ] 
                                         sp "}" 
 
clea-issuer            = id-issuer msp Name 
clea-thisUpdate        = id-thisUpdate msp Time 
clea-distributionPoint = id-distributionPoint msp 
                            DistributionPointName 
 
id-thisUpdate        = %x74.68.69.73.55.70.64.61.74.65 
                          ; "thisUpdate" 
id-distributionPoint = %x64.69.73.74.72.69.62.75.74.69.6F.6E 
                          %x50.6F.69.6E.74 ; "distributionPoint" 
 
DistributionPointName = dpn-fullName / dpn-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer 
 
dpn-fullName                = id-fullName ":" GeneralNames 
dpn-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer = id-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer ":" 
                                 RelativeDistinguishedName 
 
id-fullName                = %x66.75.6C.6C.4E.61.6D.65 ; "fullName" 
id-nameRelativeToCRLIssuer = %x6E.61.6D.65.52.65.6C.61.74.69.76.65 
                                %x54.6F.43.52.4C.49.73.73.75.65.72 
                                ; "nameRelativeToCRLIssuer" 
 
 
5.2 Certificate List Match 
 
Certificate List match is defined in 11.3.6 of [9]. The string 
description of the certificateListMatch matching rule is: 
 
( 2.5.13.39 NAME 'certificateListMatch' 
    SYNTAX 1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.4) 
 
The syntax definition is: 
 
(1.2.826.0.1.3344810.7.4 DESC 'Certificate List Assertion' ) 
 
The ASN.1 for CertificateListAssertion is defined in 11.3.6 of [9], as  
are the semantics of its components. 
 
The LDAP-specific encoding of an assertion value of this syntax is  
defined by [13] and describedby the following ABNF: 
 
CertificateListAssertion = "{"    [ sp cla-issuer ] 
                              [ sep sp cla-minCRLNumber ] 
                              [ sep sp cla-maxCRLNumber ] 
                              [ sep sp cla-reasonFlags ] 
                              [ sep sp cla-dateAndTime ] 
                              [ sep sp cla-distributionPoint ] 
                              [ sep sp cla-authorityKeyIdentifier ] 
                                    sp "}" 
 
cla-issuer       = id-issuer       msp Name 
cla-minCRLNumber = id-minCRLNumber msp CRLNumber 
cla-maxCRLNumber = id-maxCRLNumber msp CRLNumber 
cla-reasonFlags  = id-reasonFlags  msp ReasonFlags 
cla-dateAndTime  = id-dateAndTime  msp Time 
 
cla-distributionPoint      = id-distributionPoint msp 
                                DistributionPointName 
cla-authorityKeyIdentifier = id-authorityKeyIdentifier msp 
                                AuthorityKeyIdentifier 
 
id-minCRLNumber = %x6D.69.6E.43.52.4C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72 
                     ; "minCRLNumber" 
id-maxCRLNumber = %x6D.61.78.43.52.4C.4E.75.6D.62.65.72 
                     ; "maxCRLNumber" 
id-reasonFlags  = %x72.65.61.73.6F.6E.46.6C.61.67.73 ; "reasonFlags" 
id-dateAndTime  = %x64.61.74.65.41.6E.64.54.69.6D.65 ; "dateAndTime" 
 
CRLNumber = INTEGER-0-MAX 
 
ReasonFlags = BIT-STRING 
              / "{" [ sp reason-flag 
                   *( "," sp reason-flag ) ] sp "}" 
 
reason-flag = id-unused 
              / id-keyCompromise 
              / id-cACompromise 
              / id-affiliationChanged 
              / id-superseded 
              / id-cessationOfOperation 
              / id-certificateHold 
              / id-privilegeWithdrawn 
              / id-aACompromise 
 
id-unused               = %x75.6E.75.73.65.64 ; "unused" 
id-keyCompromise        = %x6B.65.79.43.6F.6D.70.72.6F.6D.69.73.65 
                             ; "keyCompromise" 
id-cACompromise         = %x63.41.43.6F.6D.70.72.6F.6D.69.73.65 
                             ; "cACompromise" 
id-affiliationChanged   = %x61.66.66.69.6C.69.61.74.69.6F.6E.43.68 
                             %x61.6E.67.65.64 ; "affiliationChanged" 
id-superseded           = %x73.75.70.65.72.73.65.64.65.64 
                             ; "superseded" 
id-cessationOfOperation = %x63.65.73.73.61.74.69.6F.6E.4F.66.4F.70 
                             %x65.72.61.74.69.6F.6E 
                             ; "cessationOfOperation" 
id-certificateHold      = %x63.65.72.74.69.66.69.63.61.74.65.48.6F 
                             %x6C.64 ; "certificateHold" 
id-privilegeWithdrawn   = %x70.72.69.76.69.6C.65.67.65.57.69.74.68 
                             %x64.72.61.77.6E ; "privilegeWithdrawn" 
id-aACompromise         = %x61.41.43.6F.6D.70.72.6F.6D.69.73.65 
                             ; "aACompromise" 
 
 
6. PKI Object Classes 
 
6.1 PKI user object class 
 
The PKI user object class MAY be used in defining entries for objects  
that may be the subject of public-key certificates. 
 
     ( 2.5.6.21 NAME 'pkiUser' SUP top AUXILIARY 
     MAY userCertificate ) 
 
6.2 PKI CA object class 
 
The PKI CA object class MAY be used in defining entries for objects that  
act as certification authorities. 
 
     ( 2.5.6.22 NAME 'pkiCA' SUP top AUXILIARY 
     MAY ( cACertificate $ certificateRevocationList $  
     authorityRevocationList $ crossCertificatePair ) ) 
 
6.3 CRL Distribution Point object class 
 
The CRL Distribution Point object class MAY be used in defining entries  
for objects which act as CRL Distribution Points 
 
     ( 2.5.6.19 NAME 'cRLDistributionPoint' SUP top STRUCTURAL MUST cn 
     MAY (certificateRevocationList $ authorityRevocationList $ 
     DeltaRevocationList ) ) 
 
6.4 Delta CRL object class 
 
The delta CRL object class is used in defining entries for objects that  
hold delta revocation lists (e.g. CAs, AAs etc.). 
 
      ( 2.5.6.23 NAME 'deltaCRL' SUP top AUXILIARY  
      MAY deltaRevocationList ) 
 
 
6.5 Certificate Policy and CPS object class 
 
The CP CPS object class MAY be used in defining entries for objects that  
contain certificate policy and / or certification practice information 
 
     ( 2.5.6.30 NAME 'cpCPS' SUP top AUXILIARY MAY ( certificatePolicy $ 
     certificationPracticeStmt ) ) 
 
6.6 PKI Certification Path object class 
 
The PKI certification path object class MAY be used in defining entries  
for objects that contain PKI certification paths. It will generally be  
used in conjunction with entries of structural object class pkiCA. 
 
     ( 2.5.6.31 NAME 'pkiCertPath' SUP top AUXILIARY MAY pkiPath) 
 
 
7. Filter Examples 
 
The following examples are written using the string representation of  
Search filters defined in [18]. Line-breaks have been added as an aid to  
readability. 
 
i) To match on the serial number of a PKI certificate using  
extensibleMatch with component matching 
 
       (userCertificate:componentFilterMatch:= 
       item:{ component "serialNumber", rule integerMatch, 
       value 12345 }) 
 ii) To exactly match one certificate using extensibleMatch with  
certificateExactMatch and GSERCertificateExactAssertion  
 
       (userCertificate:certificateExactMatch:= {serialNumber 12345 , 
       issuer rdnSequence: "O=truetrust ltd, C=GB" } ) 
 
 
iii) To exactly match one certificate using equalityMatch with  
certificateExactMatch and GSERCertificateExactAssertion 
 
      (UserCertificate= {serialNumber 12345 , issuer rdnSequence: 
       "O=truetrust ltd, C=GB" }) 
 
iv) To exactly match one certificate using equalityMatch with  
certificateExactMatch and SimpleCertificateExactAssertion 
 
      (UserCertificate=12345$O=truetrust ltd, C=GB) 
 
v) To exactly match one certificate using extensibleMatch with component  
matching 
 
      (userCertificate:componentFilterMatch:=and:{ 
      item:{ component "serialNumber", rule integerMatch, value 12345 }, 
      item:{ component "issuer.rdnSequence", rule 
      distinguishedNameMatch, value "O=truetrust ltd, C=GB"  } }) 
 
vi) To match on certificates containing a certain email address as a  
subjectAltName 
 
      (userCertificate:componentFilterMatch:=item:{ 
       component "toBeSigned.extensions.*.extnValue. 
       content.(2.5.29.17).*.rfc822Name", 
       rule caseIgnoreIA5Match, value "person@email.address.com" }) 
 
 
8. Security Considerations 
 
This [Internet Draft/Standard] describes the schema for the storage 
and matching of attribute certificates and revocation lists in an 
LDAP directory server. It does not address the protocol for the 
retrieval of this information. 
 
LDAP servers SHOULD use access control information to protect the 
information during its storage. In addition, clients MAY choose to 
encrypt the attributes in the attribute certificates before storing 
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i) Added ABNF notation for all of the syntaxes. 
 
ii) Removed the restriction on the syntax of Distribution Point Names. 
 
iii) Removed constraints on IssuerSerial. 
 
iv) Bug detected in X.509 AttributeCertificateExactMatch that will need 
resolving. 
 
v) Changed the string encodings for non-exact matches to keywords for  




i) Added and corrected all X.509 PKI schema definitions, since these  
have been removed from RFC2252-bis. 
ii) Changed assertion syntaxes to use the syntax defined by Component  
Matching Rules 




i) Separation in PKI and PMI IDs. 
ii) Examples of filters have been added 
iii) Text has been added to mandate that servers must store and  
retrieve many of the syntaxes defined in this ID exactly as given. 
iv) The ;binary encoding option has been removed in accordance with  
work in the LDAPBIS group. A new LDAP-specific encoding has been  
defined which has exactly the same syntax as the old ;binary  
encoding. 
v) We have obsoleted RFC 2587 and RFC 2256 and copied the relevant  
schemas into this document. 
vi) We have added some new PKI schema appearing for the first time in  
X.509(2000) e.g. pkiPath 
 
14. Outstanding Issues 
 
i. We need to decide if userSMIMECertificates should also be  
supported as part of this profile or not. 
ii. We have added a CPS attribute and a CPS pointer attribute. These  
are adapted from the certificationPracticeStmt attribute in the  
X.509 standard which is a choice of either the CPS or a pointer to  
it. However our pointer is simply a URI (as in the CPS qualifier  
extension in the PKIX profile) whereas the X.500 pointer is a  
GeneralName and an optional hash. Are these changes sensible and  
acceptable? 
iii. We have added a matching rule to the certificatePolicy attribute.  
No matching rule is defined in X.509, so we have reported this as  
a defect. Should we stick with the X.509 syntax or create two  
alternative attributes (a pointer and a policy) as in the CPS  
case. 
iv. We have made the matching rule for supportedAlgorithms as the  
objectIdentifierFirstComponentMatch. RFC2256 did not specify any  
matching rule and X.509(2001) specifies a more complex matching  
rule. Should we align with X.509 or not? 
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